"Second Generations: Past, Present, Future" by Roger Waldinger & Joel Perlmann
Second  Generations:  Past,  Present,  Future 
Roger  Waldinger* 
Joel  Perlmann*  * 
Working  Paper  No.  200 
August  1997 
*Department  of  Sociology  and  Lewis  Center  for  Regional  Policy  Studies,  UCLA 
**Department  of  History  and  The  Jcromc  Levy  Economics  Institute,  Bard  College 
Thonlrr tr\  lonnt Ah.,_1  ,,nhnrl  l-k&cl  T nn~v  ~nrl  Min  7hm,  few  rnmmontc  nn  on  cxwli~~  rlvnft  Th;c  ncan~v  .r,.zc  n..~w,,.nrl  I IKlLIRD  I”  JLLIIVL n”u-Yu~II”u)  UC&” IU  k”y’L,  u11\1 1.1111  Llll”U  I”1  U”II”II~IIL”  “II  CL11  CLIll‘rl  U1c411. I ‘llbz  pay”  ** cl0 p  tipuru 
for  presentation  at  the  AS&ISA  North  American  Conference,  “Millenial  Milestone:  The  Heritage  and  Future  of 
Sociology,”  August  7-8,  1997,  Toronto,  Canada. Abstract 
This  paper  takes  a doubting,  though  friendly,  look  at the  hypotheses  of  “second 
generation  deciine”  and  “segmented  assimiiation”  that have  framed  the  emerging  research 
agenda  on  the  new  second  generation.  We  begin  with  a review  of the  basic  approach, 
outlining  the  logic  of argument,  and  specifying  the  central  contentions.We  then  head 
toward  the  past,  in search  of material  that  will  illuminate  both  the  parallels  and  points  of 
distinction  between  the  immigrant  children  who  grew  up  in the  first  half  of the  20th 
century  and  those  who  will  move  into  adulthood  during  the  century  to come.  Last,we 
return  to the  present,  inquiring  both  into  the  characteristics  of those  children  of 
immigrants  who  might  find  themselves  at risk,  and  the  precise  source  of any  such  peril. Thirty  years  after  the  Hart-CeIIer  Act  brought  renewed  immigration  to  the  United 
States,  the  immigration  research  agenda  is slowly  shifting  from  the  newcomers  to  their 
children.  The  timing  is just  right,  as it is only  within  the  past  decade  that  immigrants’ 
children  have  become  a sizable  presence  in American  schools,  and  still more  recently  that 
they  have  moved  from  the  schools  into  the  labor  market.  But  the  tenor  of the  times  is 
clearly  not  good.  America  is in the  throes  of another  debate  over  immigration,  and  this 
time,  the  parties  that  would  narrow,  if not  close,  the  door  to  immigration  seem  to  have  the 
upper  hand.  An unhealthy  brew  of popular  anxiety  whipped  up  by politicians  who  can 
never  stoop  too  low  in search  of votes  lies behind  the  emerging  trend  toward  restriction. 
Nonetheless,  there  are  non-partisan,  scholarly  reasons  for  worry.  Many  of the  newcomers 
arrive  with  low  levels  of skill,  converging  on  a handful  of metropolitan  areas  that  lack  the 
resources  neeaea  to  speea  rne  process  or immigrant  aadprauon.  And  these  days,  even  me  3-3  I-  f .l_- .__~  ____ -l?-._:___..r  _,(,..r_L!-.-  -_.--  *L_ 
friends  of immigration  will concede  that  serious  questions  have  been  raised  about 
immigrants’  prospects  and  about  the  costs  associated  with  absorbing  the  many  newcomers 
who  have  moved  to  the  United  States  over  the  past  fifteen  years. 
Not  surprisingly,  then,  the  emerging  scholarship  on the  children  of immigrants  has 
begun  on  a note  of inflected  pessimism.  Recent  publications  by Herbert  Gans,  Alejandro 
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immigrants  themselves  -- outline,  with  clarity  and  acuity,  the  reasons  for  concern:  Coming 
from  everywhere  but  Europe,  today’s  newcomers  are visibly  identifiable,  and  enter  a 
mainly  white  society  still not  cured  of its racist  afllictions.  Shifts  in the  structure  of the 
economy  aggravate  the  impact  of discrimination:  while  poorly-educated  immigrant  parents 
seem  to  have  no  trouble  getting  started  at the  very  bottom,  the  shift  toward  knowledge- intensive  jobs  means  that  the  next  generation  will have  to  do  well  in school  if it wishes  to 
surpass  the  achievements  of the  foreign-born.  With  big-city  schools  in more  trouble  than 
ever  before,  the  outlook  for  successful  passage  through  the  educational  system  seems  dim. 
As  second  generation  expectations  are unlikely  to  remain  unchanged,  we  can  count  on  a 
mismatch  between  the  aspirations  of immigrant  children  and  requirements  of the jobs 
which  they  seek.’ 
So  our  leading  sociological  commentators  on  ethnicity  are worried  about  “second 
generation  decline”.  Their  anxieties,  however,  take  a very  different  form  from  that  voiced 
in the  popular  press:  there  we  read  that  the  children  of today’s  immigrants  are  failing  to 
assimilate,  in supposed  contrast  to  their  predecessors  of earlier  in the  century.  She 
scholarly  literature  assures  us that  new  second  generation  is assimilating,  all right,  but  in 
‘%egmented9i fashion,  with  some  large,  though  so far undefined,  proportion  likely  to 
converge  with  the  “urban  underclass.” 
This  new  perspective  on  second  generation  change  emerged  just  as the  topic  of 
immigrants’  children  showed  up  on the  scholarly  radar  screen.  As such,  it seems  likely  to 
have  been  designed  for  agenda-setting  purposes,  laying  out  a set  of leads  and  sensitizing 
concepts  for  subsequent  researchers  to  modify,  extend,  alter,  and  systematize  as empirical 
work  on  the  new  second  generation  moved  ahead.  But  these  ideas  have  struck  a 
particularly  deep  chord:  consequently,  the  hypotheses  of “second  generation  decline”  or 
“segmented  assimilation”  have  already  assumed  canonical  form.  As can  be  seen  from  the 
articles  appearing  in the International  Migration  Review’s  special  issue  on  “The  New Second  Generation”,  or  from  any  other  perusal  of this  rapidly  growing  literature,  the 
research  community  has taken  the  new  perspective  as conventional  wisdom.2 
One  can  only  admire  the  persuasive  power  of ideas.  But  it does  seem  that  a 
skeptical  review  is long  overdue.  While  the  new  views  present  a powerful  case,  the  core 
contentions  rest  on  a set  of assumptions  neither  adequately  specified  and  nor  beyond 
reproach.  Moreover,  the  current  pessimism  is heavily  influenced  by a particular,  never 
fully  articulated  view  of the  past,  adopting  an interpretive  perspective  that  puts  the 
contemporary  situation  in an especially  unfavorable  light.  The  anxiety  about  emerging 
second  generation  trends  is also  notably  broad-brushed:  while  one  can  argue  that  some 
portion  of today’s  second  generation  is either  stalled  or headed  downward,  the  relative 
size  of that  portion  is certainly  relevant,  and  that  matter  is never addressed.  And  the 
underlying  case  for  pessimism  relies  on  a set  of analogies  to  the  experience  of other, 
contemporary  minorities  that  have  not  yet  received  much  attention,  and  may  not  bear  up 
under  the  scrutiny. 
Thus,  this  paper  takes  a doubting,  if friendly,  look  at the  hypotheses  of “second 
generation  decline”  and  “segmented  assimilation”.  We begin  with  a review  of the  basic 
approach,  outlining  the  logic  of argument,  and  specifying  the  central  contentions.  We  then 
head  toward  the  past,  in search  of material  that  will illuminate  both  the  parallels  and 
points  of distinction  between  the  immigrant  children  who  grew  up  in the  first  half  of the 
20*  century  and  those  who  will move  into  adulthood  during  the  century  to  come.  Last, 
we  return  to  the  present,  inquiring  both  into  the  characteristics  of those  children  of 
immigrant  who  might  find  themselves  at risk,  and  the  precise  source  of  any  such  peril. Second  generation  decline? 
There  is little  question  that  many,  possibly  even  most  immigrant  children  are 
heading  upward,  exemplified  by the  large  number  of Asian  students  enrolled  in the  nation’s 
leading  university,  some  the  children  of workers,  others  the  descendants  of immigrants 
who  moved  right  into  the  middle-class.  The  rapid  Asian  ascent  evokes  parallels  with  the 
past,  most  clearly  the  first  and  second  generation  Jews  who  began  appearing  at City 
College,  and  then  Harvard,  Columbia,  and  other  prestigious  schools  in numbers  that 
discomfited  the  then  dominant  WASPS.  As  Steinberg  (198 1) pointed  out  some  years  ago, 
it was  the  Jews’ good  fortune  to  have  moved  to  America  just  when  the  educational  system 
was  expanding  and  moving  away  from  its classical  past,  and  to  have  converged  on  the 
Northeast,  where  opportunities  to  pursue  schooling  were  particularly  good.  But  even  so, 
schleppers greatly  outnumbered  scholars,  and  the  proportion  of Jews  who  made  their  way 
to  Harvard  or  its proletarian  cousin,  CCNY,  was  dwarfed  by those  who  moved  ahead  as 
skilled  workers,  clerks,  or  small  businessowners.  In this  light,  the  Asian  advance  into 
higher  education  remains  phenomenal:  in the  Los  Angeles  region,  for  example,  18 to  24 
year  olds  in every  Asian  group  (Vietnamese  immigrants  who  arrived  in the  United  States 
after the age oflO  included)  attend  college  at a rate  that  exceeds  native-born  whites,  with 
the  native-born  leagues  ahead  of native-born  whites  on  this  count.  And  ironically,  the 
temper  tantrums  of  “angry  white  men”  seem  likely  to  accelerate,  rather  than  reverse  this 
trend  -- quite  a different  turn  of events  than  that  which  transpired  in the  Ivy  League  70 
years  ago. Even  though  some  portion  of today’s  second  generation  is rapidly  ascending  the 
totem  pole,  others  appear  to  be left behind;  it is this  group  that  has  attracted  scholarly 
interest  and  concern.  As we  read  the  emerging  literature,  the  obstacles  to  progress  appear 
to  stem  from  a complex  of intersecting  economic,  social,  and  psychological  factors.  The 
starting  point  is race:  since  the  European  immigrants,  as Portes  and  Zhou  write,  were 
“uniformly  white”,  ”  skin  color  reduced  a major  barrier  to  entry  into  the  American 
mainstream  (76).”  Like  beauty,  skin  color  lies in the  eyes  of the  beholder,  and  as Gans 
reminds  us,  white  southern  and  eastern  European  immigrants  were  earlier  characterized  as 
races.  Henry  Adams,  E.A.  Ross  and  others  of their  ilk were  certainly  convinced  that  the 
swarthy  masses  of the  turn  of the  century  were  of a different  kind;  since  Portes  and  Zhou 
are  quite  right  in arguing  that  race,  or  rather  the  meanings  associated  with  it,  “is a trait 
belonging  to  the  host  society”,  one  wonders  whether  levels  of xenophobia  and  racism  are 
indeed  higher  today  than  they  were  in the  1920s  or  1930s  -- when  the  last  second 
generation  came  of age.  Still, the  thinking  today  concludes  that  the  “ethnic  and  racial 
discrimination”  suffered  by contemporary  dark-skinned  and  non-Caucasian  immigrants 
seems  “more  permanent”  (Gans,  176). 
Perhaps.  But  the  argumentation  has  more  to  do  with  second  generation  response 
than  with  the  mainstream’s  problems  with  race,  After  ail, discriminatory  practices  &it  by 
the  children  must  surely  be experienced  by the  parents,  who,  in self-presentation  and 
cultural  attributes,  are far more  distinct  than  their  offspring.  The  children,  however, 
respond  differently:  they  have  a heightened  perception  of discrimination  and  its prevalence;  and  they  react  to  actual  and  perceived  discrimination  by rejecting  the  dreams 
that  impelled  their  parents. 
But  how  to  account  for  this  distinctive  second  generational  response?  Answer:  the 
advent  of the  second  generation  yields  an attitudinal  shift,  which  in turn,  stems  from 
varying  sources.  One  derives  from  the  immigration  process  itselc  following  Piore  (1979), 
we  can  caii this  %econd  generation  revoit”.  The  immigrants  arrive  wiiiing  to  do  the jobs 
that  natives  won’t  hold:  however  low  the jobs  may  fall in the  U.S.  hierarchy,  they  still offer 
wages  and  compensation  superior  to  the  opportunities  back  home.  Having  been  exposed 
to  different  wage  and  consumption  standards  from  the  start,  the  children  want  more; 
consequently,  the  question  is whether  their  “careers...keep  pace  with  their  U.S.-acquired 
aspirations”  (Portes  and  Zhou,  85). 
For  Piore,  the  generational  shift  in immigrant  aspirations  was  inherent  in the 
processes  of migration  and  settlement  and  thus  a recurrent  phenomenon.  This  would 
suggest  greater  continuity  between  yesterday’s  and  today’s  second  generations,  but  Portes, 
Zhou,  and  Gans  all argue  that  the  mismatch  between  aspiration  and  opportunity  is greater 
today  than  ever  before,  and  therefore  the  greater  likelihood  of frustration  as well  (shades 
of Merton!)  The  conundrum  of the  contemporary  second  generation  lies in the  continuing 
transformation  of the  U.S.  economy.  The  manufacturing  economy  of old  allowed  for  a 
three,  possibly  four  generational  move  beyond  the  bottom-most  positions  to  which  the 
immigrants  were  originally  consigned.  Even  though  low-skilled  jobs  persist,  occupational 
segmentation  has  “reduced  the  opportunities  for  incremental  upward  mobility  through 
well-paid,  blue-collar  positions”  (Portes  and  Zhou,  85).  The  declining  viability  of  small 
6 business  reduce  the  possibilities  for  advancement  through  the  expansion  of businesses 
established  by the  immigrant  generation.  And  the  general  stalling  of  mobility  reduces  the 
chances  for  ethnic  succession:  Jews  and  Italians  followed  the  Irish  into  the  public  sector  as 
the  latter  moved  on to  more  lucrative  pursuits;  today’s  civil servants  are unlikely  to  enjoy 
the  same  options,  which  will close  off this  path  of mobility  to  today’s  second  generation. 
Of course,  the  manner  in which  the  comparison  is constructed  heightens  the 
contrast  between  the  experience  of the  earlier  and  the  later  second  generations.  The 
children  of the  European  immigrants,  it appears,  automatically  moved  up  the  ladder, 
taking  over  the  “relatively  secure  but  low-status  blue-  and  white-collar  jobs  that  WASPS 
and  the  descendants  of earlier  immigrants  would  no  longer  accept”  (Gans,  177).  The 
history  of the  earlier  second  generation  is also  removed  from  time,  recounted  in the 
afterglow  of the  prosperity  of the  post-  World  War  II  period,  when  in reality  the  children 
of immigrants  began  entering  the  labor  market  in the  192Os, 193Os, and  even  before. 
Historical  considerations  aside,  the  advent  of the  hourglass  economy  confronts  the 
immigrant  children  with  a cruel  choice:  either  acquire  the  college,  and  other  advanced 
degrees  needed  to  move  into  the  professional/managerial  elite,  or  else  accept  the  same 
menial  jobs  to  which  the  first  generation  was  consigned.  Given  the  aspirational  shift 
entailed  in “second  generation  revolt”,  the  latter  possibility  is not  in the  cards.  As Gans 
writes:  _ 
If the  young  people  are  offered  immigrant  jobs,  there  are  some  good  reasons  why 
they  might  turn  them  down.  They  come  to  the  world  of work  with  American 
standards,  and  may  not  even  be familiar  with  the  old-country  conditions..by  which 
immigrants.  .judged  the. urban  job  market.  Nor  do  they  have  the  long-range  goals 
that  persuaded  their  parents  to  work  long  hours  at low  wages;  they  know  they 
cannot  be deported  and  are  here  to  stay  in America,  and  most  likely  they  are not 
obliged  to  send  money  to  relatives  left  in the  old  country.  From  their  perspective, 
7 immigrant  jobs  are  demeaning;  moreover,  illegal jobs  and  scams  may  pay  more  and 
look  better  socially  -- especially  when  peer  pressure  is also  present  (182). 
The  scenario  has the  ring  of plausibility;  but  note  the  slippage  in the  argument.  One  need 
not  have  discriminating  employers  and  “poor  young  men  with  dark  skins”  (Gans  182) for 
the  hourglass  economy  to  still yield  the  same  effect.  As long  as the  parents  arrive  with 
very  little  schooling  (consider  the  fact  that  10 percent  of Mexican  immigrants  in the  L.A. 
region  report  zero  years  of  schooling),  and  doing  better  requires  a substantial  increment  of 
formal  education,  immigrant  chiidren  who  drop  out  of  high  d00i  or  iearn  iittie  or nothing 
while  there  will do  poorly  -- even  in a world  of color-blind  and  benevolent  employers. 
Gans  links  aspirational  change  to  the  process  of settlement;  that  element  appears  in 
Portes  and  Zhou  as well,  but  they  place  greater  accent  on  contingent  factors.  The  new 
immigrants  converge  on  central  cities  where  they  live in close  contact  with  earlier 
established,  native  minorities.  Proximity  to  African-  and  Mexican-Americans  yields  two 
ef%ects.  One  has to  do  with  outsider  categorization:  obiivious  to  finer  distinctions  of 
nativity  and  ethnicity,  whites  simplify  reality,  identifying  immigrants  with  their  native-born 
homologs.  More  importantly,  propinquity  yields  exposure  to  the  “adversarial”  norms  of 
“marginalized  youth”.  As  immigrant  children  come  into  contact  with  the  reactive 
subculture  developed  by native  minorities,  they  undergo  a process  of  “socialization”  that 
“can effectively  block  parental  plans  for  intergenerational  mobility.”  (Portes  and  Zhou, 
In  all likelihood,  factors  inherent  to  the  migration  process,  as well  as those  of a 
more  contingent  nature,  are  at work.  At the  very  least,  theoretical  clarity  requires  that  we 
distinguish  between  the  two;  empirical  research  will also  need  to  assess  their  relative importance.  While  both  explanations  yield  the  same  effect,  “second  generation  revolt”,  in 
the  Piore/Gans  view  dne~  not  rtyG-e  the  nresence  of  native  minnrities  and  their  > ----  -l---- -  ----  r‘_______  --  -____.  _ _.________-__  -___ 
oppositional  subculture.  By  contrast,  it is not  clear  whether  exposure  to  a pre-existing 
oppositional  subculture  would  work  in equally  insidious  ways,  were  there  not  an 
immigrant  predisposition  toward  that  point  of view,  born  out  of the  frustration  produced 
by the  hourglass  economy.  Alternatively,  the  “oppositional  subculture”  may  be nothing 
more  than  the  expression  of  “second  generation  revolt”,  in which  case  the  explanation 
founders  on  an attribution  error.  Historical  evidence  is germane  to  this  question,  since  it 
would  allow  us to  determine  whether  or  not  an “oppositional  subculture”  is sui generis  to 
the  situation  of contemporary  immigrants,  for  whom  the  “proximal  host”  is a visible, 
stigmatized,  native-born  minority. 
Both  explanations  also  highlight  a similar  factor:  namely,  exposure  to  influences 
outside  the  immigrant  communities.  The  argument  for  inherent  factors  underlines  the 
impact  of  the  broader  society,  and  its culture  of consumption.  By  contrast,  the  argument 
for  contingent  factors  underlines  the  impact  of a subsociety  and  its distinctive  sub-culture; 
to  the  extent  that  the  subculture  reflects  the  broader  culture  in its emphasis  on 
individualism,  acquisitiveness,  and  materialism,  the  two  lines  of influence  may  be highly 
intertwined. 
It  is atso  worth  recalling  that  the  type  of immigrants  around  which  Piore  organized 
his theoretical  framework  began  as temporary  migrants  and  came  from  peasant  societies. 
It  is precisely  those  origins  and  circumstances  that  account  for the  divergence  between 
first  generation  expectations  and  the  wage  and  consumption  standards  of the  native-born. Though  the  argument  is never  developed,  it would  follow  that  the  diffision  of 
consumption  norms  from  host  to  sending  countries  could  alter  expectationsprior  to 
migration,  and  therefore  would  also  accelerate  the  process  of second  generation  revolt.  In 
that  case,  the  new  immigration  may  diryer from  the  oid  in the  degree  ofpre-migration 
cultural  change;  if the  old  world  communities  were  more  isolated  and  more  attached  to 
traditional  modes  of  scarcity-bound  consumption,  the  influence  of U. S. consumption 
patterns  may  have  worked  with  a more  delayed  effect,  making  second  generation  revolt 
less  intense  than  it is today. 
In  sum,  the  recent  attempts  to  conceptualize  the  dilemmas  the  second  generation 
have  the  great  merit  of laying  out  an important  research  agenda  and  directing  our  attention 
toward  hypotheses  which  can  be measured  and  assessed.  While  these  conceptual  efforts 
suffer  from  the  usual  drawbacks  of logical  consistency,  adequacy  of evidence,  and 
appropriateness  of the  comparative  frame,  the  main  problem  may  simply  be that  the  effort 
is premature.  The  children  of today’s  immigrants  may  well  be  star-crossed;  but  a careful 
comparison  at the  past  may  prevent  us from  consigning  them  to  oblivion  and  offer  a more 
realistic  assessment  of  second  generation  prospects  and  the  time-honored,  predictable 
travails  they  will  encounter. 
Second  Generations  Past 
Given’the  distinctive  characteristics  of today’s  immigrants,  one  might  not  have 
expected  the  debate  over  their  children’s  prospects  to  have  quickly  taken  such  a 
pessimistic  turn.  At the  early  part  of the  20th  century,  immigrants  were  a relatively 
homogenous  population  of persons  narrowly  concentrated  at the  bottom  of the 
10 occupational  scale.  True,  there  were  entrepreneurs  among  the  immigrants  of old  -- mainly 
persons  with  a background  in trade  (as among  the  Jews)  or unskilled  laborers  who 
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immigrants  from  all major  groups,  save  the  British,  were  far more  likely  to  work  at the 
least  skilled  jobs  than  were  native  whites  of native  parentage  and  all were less  likely  to 
work  in white  collar jobs,  whether  at high  or low  levels.  Italians,  Poles,  and  other  Eastern 
and  Southern  Europeans  disproportionately  fell into jobs  at the  very  bottom  of the 
occupational  ladder.  Low  levels  of literacy  --just  over  half  of the  “other  Eastern  and 
Cnuthern  Furoneans”  renorted  that  thev  could  read.  and  iust  over  half  of  the  Italians  could  L--  _--_-__  ‘_-_r_--‘_  --I------  -----  .__-,  _  - -.-  . -__,  -..-  ,-__  --  _..- 
not  speak  English,  for  example  -- also  distinguished  these  groups  from  the  newcomers 
from  western  and  northern  Europe.  Though  the  Jews  entered  America  at a level  above 
their  counterparts  from  elsewhere  in southern  and  eastern  Europe,  they  still began  with 
quite  a disadvantage  -- in clear  contrast  to  the  high  skilled  immigrants  of the  post-1965 
period. 
To  be sure,  the  adult  second  generation  of the  time  found  itself  at less  of a 
disadvantage  -- although  the  British  and  German,  and  even  the  Irish  immigrants  of  an 
earlier  wave  began  with  advantages  that  the  newcomers  of the  turn  of the  century  never 
possessed.  Even  so,  immigrant  adolescents  of all national  origins  were  a good  deal  less 
likely  than  natives  of native  parentage  to  remain  in school.  The  gap  in school  attendance 
in school  attendance  is surely  worth  recalling:  among  14 and  18 year  old  boys,  the 
children  of Polish,  Italian,  and  other  Eastern  and  Southern  European  origin  were  about 
three  times  less  likely  to  attend  school  than  native  whites  of native  parentage.  Differences 
ii in background  characteristics  account  for  part  of that  gap:  with  all conditions  equal  and, 
anal takino  the  hect  nf  thP  PQCPP  Ttalisln  14-18  vear  nlr-4 hnw  WPT-P ahnllt  twn_thidc  BP  UIaU  bU..“.b  C..Y  “I”.  v.  LI.V  VULI~.s, A.U..U..  JV”’  “IU  ““JU  ..I._  uvvuc  L..V  l  .UIUD  u.J 
likely  as their  native  white  counterparts  to  be enrolled  in school.  Since  in reality, 
conditions  weren’t  equal,  disparities  of this  nature  were  unlikely  to  be have  been 
inconsequential  for  the  young  people  who  entered  the  labor  market  around  World  War  I 
and  continued  working  on  to  the  mid-1960s,  a period  when  skill requirements  were 
continually  enhanced. 
Put  simply:  the  good  old  days..  they  were  terrible.  Distance  and  nostalgia  should 
not  blind  us to  the  very  significant  disadvantages  that  the  earlier  second  generation 
encountered.  It  may  be the  case  that  today’s  second  generation  begins  equally  far behind 
the  starting  line  -- though  the  large  number  of middle-class  immigrants  makes  this  an 
unlikely  scenario  for  many.  The  immigrant  children  of the  turn  of the  20*  century  might 
still have  to  race  harder  and  faster  than  their  historical  counterparts,  given  the  nature  and 
pace  of economic  change.  But  any comparison  with  the  past  has  to  build  on  an 
appropriate  understanding  of how  the  earlier  catch-up  took  place;  and  in this  respect,  the 
new  approaches  do  not  quite  seem  adequate. 
Paths:  Today’s  literature  begins  with  the  assumption  that  yesterday’s  second 
generation  followed  a common  upward  path,  of which  the  first  step  involved  access  to 
manufacturing  jobs  one  or  more  rungs  above  the  positions  held  by their  parents.  That 
assumption  has the  ring  of plausibility:  the  immigrants  themselves  were  recruited  to  staff 
the  growing  industrial  complex,  which  in turn  continued  to  provide  a large  share  of 
employment  through  mid-century,  especially  in those  regions  of the  country  on which  the 
12 immigrants  of the  1880-1920  period  converged.  But  the  historical  literature  is silent  on 
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in retrospect,  that  is, now  that  we  no  longer  have  it, or  at least,  not  in the  same  form. 
More  importantly,  the  conventional  view  is likely  persuasive  in part  because  its view  of the 
past  is simple,  and  simple  always  runs  the  risk  of being  simplistic.  Some  groups  clearly 
moved  up  faster  than  the  others,  with  the  Jews  the  best  case  in point,  and  for  them, 
manufacturing  clearly  did  not  serve  as the  crucial  ladder  of  second  generation  advance 
(hnwever  helnfid  it might  have  been  fir  the  for&pborn):  bv  1940.  for  exa.mple,  \__-  . . _. __ ____r_-_ __  _‘,.  -,  -.  _, -__ 
manufacturing  accounted  for  less than  a third  of employment  in the  second  generation 
Jewish  niches  in New  York  City,  and  its importance  eroded  severely  over  the  following 
ten  years  (Waldinger,  1996). 
Other  groups  also  found  alternative  paths  of upward  movement,  for  example,  the 
Irish,  with  their  reliance  on the  public  sector  (and  their  much  greater  dependence  on 
service  employment,  especially  among  women,  but  still true  for  men  as well).  And  though 
the  matter  has  not  been  well  explored,  it seems  reasonable  to  expect  considerable 
variation  among  the  very  least  skilled  of the  new  immigrants  of old,  if for  no  other  reason 
than  geographic  factors.  The  Italians,  for  example,  were  far more  likely  than  the  non- 
Jewish  East  Europeans  to  cluster  in the  New  England  and Mid-Atlantic  regions,  where 
heavy  manufacturing  was  not  nearly  as important  a source  of employment  as in the  mid- 
west,  where  the  Polish  and  Slavic  concentration  was  especially  prominent.  It’s  worth 
recalling  that  manufacturing  peaked  in New  York  City  quite  early  in the  century  (though 
somewhat  later  in the  greater  New  York  metropolitan  area);  hence  those  children  of the 
13 earlier  immigrants  who  came  of age  in New  York  found  a way  upward  despite  a rather 
.3:AT,.___4  :..A..“+.-:,1  -:.,  CL.,...  cl.,  nC_.rrC..rA  ,-...,,..,c,__A  I...  l  l..A”,  . ..L_  __c,...P.A  cl....  l...L,, 
UlllClGllC  IIIUU3LI  lit1  IIIIA  lllall  CllG  311 U~lUI  c  clILuuIILcI  cu  uy  LllUDC  WIIU  CllLCl  cu  1llC  liiUUl 
market  in Chicago,  Cleveland,  or Detroit.  Unlike  their  Jewish  counterparts,  the  second 
generation  Italians  of the  1940s  and  1950s  did  concentrate  in manufacturing,  but  the  mix 
of manufacturing  industries  -- publishing  and  printing,  apparel,  and  such  like  -- took  a 
form  reflecting  the  distinctive  nature  of New  York  economic  specializations,  and  was 
complemented  by important  clusters  in self-employment  and  the  civil  service  (Waldinger, 
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by particular  groups,  it was  unlikely  to  have  been  a factor  of determining  influence;  then  as 
now,  groups  are likely  to  have  established  niches  in the  economy,  so that  even  similarly 
low-skilled  groups  sharing  a common  spatial  arena  (let’s  say Italians  and  Poles  in 
Chicago),  ended  up  with  distinctive  patterns  of economic  specialization. 
Gendered  pathways:  So there  is reason  to  think  that  the  earlier  second 
aencrstinna  moved  ahead  a!~no  several  nnt  one  nathwava  Historical  nrecedent  need  not  ~ __-__  - _____I  ---_ ._-  0  --.  -- --3 ----  ____  =- ___..  -,_.  ---____-_ --  r _--_  - _--- ..---  __-_ 
preclude  the  possibility  that  only  one  path  can  lead  the  children  of today’s  less  skilled 
immigrants  upwards;  but  at the  very  least,  we  should  be attentive  to  the  alternatives.  In 
any  case,  today’s  reconstruction  of yesterday’s  upward  movement  is an undeniably 
gendered  account:  the  manufacturing  story  is really  about  heavy  industry  and  the 
relatively  hig6  wages  paid  to  the  semi-skilled  workers  employed  in durable  manufacturing 
from  roughly  1920 to  1970.  But  to  tell the  story  this  way  makes  it clear  that  it’s  a story 
about  men,  since  heavy  industry  had  little  room  or  need  for  women,  war  time  years 
excepted.  Clearly,  we  don’t  think  it likely  that  manufacturing  mattered  equally  for  all 
14 ethnic  groups;  but  to  the  extent  that  second  generation  groups  depended  on  factory  jobs, 
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the  more  we  move  from  early  20th  century  to  mid-century,  the  truer  that  generalization 
holds.  Certainly,  the  women  who  came  of age  after  the  192Os, were  more  likely  to  move 
into  the  then  burgeoning  white-collar  sector  than  they  were  to  gravitate  into 
manufacturing,  as did  those  of their  mothers  who  worked.  After  all, the  1920-1970 
period  was  the  golden  age  of the  female  secretary  and  the  grade  school  teacher,  and  the 
nrevalmre  nf  female  ptnre  rim-kc  WRC  inrreacino  mnirllv  RC well  There  wnmen  mav  nnt  y’W...‘V”VW  VI  a”......”  YC”.”  V.V.....  ..I”  .  ..W. W”“...b  .-y.u.,  ..Y  ..W...  * ..W”1  I. V...“..  “‘“,  ..“I 
have  stayed  in the  labor  force  after  they  married,  but  many  returned  in later  years;  later 
cohorts  certainly  enjoyed  much  longer  work  careers. 
We  note  that  these  generalizations  are unlikely  to  hold  in the  same  way  for  all 
groups;  and  the  types  of spatial  variations  noted  above  may  apply  with  ever  greater  force 
for  women,  since  a financial/headquarters  complex  like New  York  probably  generated  a 
much  stronger  demand  for  oflice  workers  than  a less variegated.  industrial  city  like Detroit  _” --  7 
or  Cleveland.  At  a minimum,  however,  a gendered  view  will tirther  complicate  our  vision 
of  earlier  second  generation  pathways  up  from  the  bottom. 
But  taking  gender  into  account  is likely  to  do  more.  On the  one  hand,  it will 
remind  us  that  there  was  historically  a feedback  between  changes  on  the  demand  side  and 
the  behavior  of  second  generation  groups.  After  all, entry  into  clerical  employment  was 
contingent  on  a different  set  of skills than  those  demanded  by manufacturing,  with  clerical 
employers  more  likely  to  insist  on  higher  levels  of literacy  and  numeracy.  As historians 
have  already  shown  us,  the  immigrant  offspring  of the  past  altered  their  attitudes  toward 
15 and  behavior  in school  when  they  realized  that  more  education  would  yield  dividends  -- 
the  recently  documented  history  of Italian-American  women  in New  York  City  a perfect 
case  in point.  For  the  1910-1950  period,  those  attaining  school  levels  modestly  above  the 
norm  -- high  school  graduation,  for  example  -- were  often  women,  with  the  benefits 
reaped  not  only  in the  marriage,  but  in the job  market  as well.  On the  other  hand, 
consideration  of gender  suggests  that  second  generation  movement  upward  involved 
income  packaging  within  households  and  male  as well  as female  strategies  for  getting 
ahead.  Recall,  that  the  work  careers  of the  descendants  of the  1880-1920  immigrants 
extended  from  the  1920s  to  the  197Os, also  a period  of steadily  rising  female  labor  force 
participation  (notwithstanding  the  momentarily  downward  slide  during  the  baby  boom 
years).  Not  all groups  of  second  generation  women  will have  traveled  up  the  curve  of 
rising  labor  force  participation  at quite  the  same  rate  -- and  establishing  these  differences 
will  again  help  flesh  out  our  understanding  of the  complexity  of earlier  experiences  -- but 
an upward  curve  appears  to  apply  to  most. 
These  historical  parallels  are  relevant  to  today’s  debates,  since  progress  among  the 
“at risk”  groups  of the  contemporary  second  generation  is likely  to  be largely  contingent 
on the  labor  market  situation  of their  female  members.  Indeed,  the  historical  comparison 
suggests  new  lines  of inquiry  to  be pursued  when  examining  the  contemporary  situation, 
since  the  match  between  second  generation  skills  and job  requirements  might  look  much 
better  for  women  and  than  men.  Second  generation  women  might  be particularly  likely  to 
benefit  from  ethnic  succession  in “pink  collar”  occupations,  from  which  native  white 
women  may  be exiting  as their job  profile  gets  upgraded.  One  can  also  imagine  parallels 
16 to  the  semi-professional  and  less  prestigious  professional  positions  (nurse/school 
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this  possibility  suggests  that  first  generation  niches  may  not  be useless  as commonly 
thought:  second  generation  West  Indians,  for  example,  might  well  use  their  mothers’ 
implantation  in health  care  as a platform  for  moving  ahead.  We  should  also  recall  that  not 
all workers  among  the  less-educated  have  fared  poorly:  declining  earnings  among  the  high 
school  (or  less  well-)  educated  is a male,  not  a female  phenomenon.  This  matters  since 
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with  household  levels  of living,  rather  than  with  differences  in individual  earnings.  Should 
female  members  of today’s  second  generation  substantially  exceed  their  mothers  in levels 
of schooling  (which,  in the  Mexican  case,  would  be represented  by completion  of high 
school)  and  also  move  into  the  labor  force  at a higher  rate,  any  decline  in men’s  earnings 
might  be offset  by the  greater  value  of women’s  contribution  to  the  household.  While  this 
is a matter  for  another  paper,  it underscores  this  section’s  central  point:  that  the  new 
conventional  wisdom  has  delivered  a deeply  gendered  account. 
Educational  advance:  In today’s  new  conventional  wisdom,  the  second 
generation  runs  into  trouble  for  a variety  of reasons,  but  most  importantly,  because 
children  of less  skilled  immigrants  find  conditions  on  the  demand  side  so  much  less 
favorable  thafi before.  Though  as a blanket  generalization,  such  a statement  is open  to 
doubt  on  several  counts,  it still has  the  ring  of truth.  Nonetheless,  it overlooks  a likely 
source  of important  constraint  .on earlier  second  generation  advance:  namely,  the  very  low 
skill levels  of many  groups,  and  the  abundance  of equally  low-skilled  competitors. 
17 Economic  historians  are  still debating  the  question  of whether  the  turn-of-the-century 
immigrants  exercised  a negative  effect  on  the  wages  and  empioyment  of the native-born; 
as with  today’s  debate,  it seems  a good  deal  safer  to  weigh  in on  the  side  of 
immigrant/immigrant  competition.  Those  children  who  entered  the  labor  market  prior  to 
1924  also  had  to  deal  with  presence  of many  low-skilled  foreign-born  competitors,  though 
their  counterparts  who  entered  maturity  in the  late  1920s  and  after  no  longer  confronted 
this  problem.  But  it’s worth  remembering  that  these  second  generation  cohorts  were  very 
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whenever  they  entered  the  labor  market,  the  children  of Italian,  Polish,  Slovak  and  other 
non-Jewish  Eastern  European  immigrants  still had  to  overcome  the  legacy  of their  parents’ 
very  low  educational  attainments. 
Relevant  also  is the  fact  that  questions  about  the  future  of yesterday’s  second 
generation  were  a commonplace  earlier  in the  century.  At the  time,  contemporaries  did 
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economy  shifting  toward  an hourglass  shape.  Rather,  they  observed  that  increasing 
proportions  of decent  jobs  required  extended  levels  of schooling,  and  worried  that  the 
children  of workers,  generally,  and  the  children  of the  immigrant  workers,  in particular, 
would  not  obtain  those  jobs,  unless  they  were  convinced  to  stay  in school  longer  than  it 
seemed  theirwont  to  do.  Contemporary  accounts,  such  as Leonard  Covello’s  study  of 
Italians  in East  Harlem  (1943/1967),  based  on  observation  and  research  from  the  1920s 
and  193Os, show  that  the  situation  was  not  good:  yes,  the  children  stayed  in school  longer 
than  the  parents  would  have  desired;  but  on the  other  hand,  they  dropped  out  long  before 
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Boston’s  East  End,  written  two  decades  later,  detected  modest  change,  noting,  for 
example,  that  “thejunior  high  school  principal’s  main  problem  [is] truancy  and  the  parental 
acquiescence  concerning  this  (Gans,  1962:  133; emphasis  added).  Joel  Perlmann’s  (1988) 
book  on  ethnic  differences  in schooling  in Providence,  RI,  albeit  treating  a somewhat 
earlier  period  (1880-1920)  points  to  very  large  lags  in school  performance  on  the  part  of 
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aggregate  differences  in the  literacy  rate  of  immigrant  groups  had  a persistent  effect  on 
the  educational  attainment  and  earnings  of the  children  of the  foreign  born  as of  1940  and 
1970,  and  even  on  their  later  descendants  as of  1990,  providing  further  reason  to  think 
that  the  earlier  second  generation  remained  at a considerable  disadvantage  relative  to  their 
third  generation-plus  counterparts  and  furthermore,  that  any  such  disadvantage  mattered. 
Note  that  nersistent  disadvantage  does  not  imolv  stasis:  clearly,  the  long-run  trend  _..-. r-_-.-  __.._  _~_.._  ___p_  _._  __ ~._. ~~~~F.,  _..._~_. 
involved  catch-up.  That  pattern  of catch-up  is relevant  for  today’s  debate  for  a variety  of 
reasons:  first,  it tells  us that  educational  performance  (and  presumably  attitudes  toward 
education)  changed  in the  direction  of convergence  with  the  mainstream,  even  among 
groups  that  started  out  as far from  mainstream  norms  as today’s  low  skilled  immigrants  are 
alleged  to  be.  It  also  reminds  us  of the  slow  pace  of any convergence,  which  provides 
some perspective  on  what  we  should  expect  of the  children  of the  most  disadvantaged 
immigrants  today. 
Mobility  regimes:  In the  new  conventional  wisdom,  structure  is largely,  if not  all, 
determining.  The  descendants  of yesterday’s  immigrants  had  the  good  fortune  of encountering  an economy  that  allowed  for  gradual  moves  upwards;  the  children’s  of 
today’s  newcomers  need  to  move  ahead  in one  giant  step.  Whether  the  structure  of 
today’s  economy  is actually  so inimical  to  second  generation  progress  deserves  greater 
debate,  but  that  is a matter  for  another  paper.  The  question  at hand  has to  do  with  the 
past. 
The  presentist  orientation  that  prevails  in today’s  discussions  takes  yesterday’s 
structure  for  granted.  But  we  should  give  the  descendants  of yesterday’s  immigrants  at 
least  some  credit  for  the  conditions  that  allowed  for  their  success:  unwilling  to  continue 
under  the  same  circumstances  that  their  parents’  endured,  this  earlier  second  generation 
aspired  to  more  -- and  got  it.  Their  collective  efforts,  involving  unionization  and  active 
support  of the  New  Deal  and  its successors,  created  a mobility  regime  that  redistributed 
resources  in a more  egalitarian  way.  Put  somewhat  differently,  the  sons  and  daughters  of 
the  unskilled  immigrants  of yore  needed  only  modest  educations  to  move  a notch  or two 
beyond  their  parents.  But  those  jobs  proved  beneficial  precisely  because  the  ethnic 
laborers  of the  1930s  through  1960s  were  able to  use  their  bargaining  capacity  to  increase 
the  working  class  share  of the  pie. 
Second  Generations  Today  and  Tomorrow 
Who  is at risk?  The  theory  of segmented  assimilation  is almost  certainly  right  in 
identifjling  niiultiple,  divergent  paths  of  second  generation  adaptation.  But  the  importance 
of that  discovery  is bound  up  with  the  matter  of the  relative  size  of the  cohorts  following 
the  different  paths;  strikingly  that  question  is never  addressed.  Considering  today’s 
situation  in light  of the  historical  experience  puts  the  issue  in an entirely  light.  While 
20 America’s  new  immigrant  population  is extraordinarily  diverse,  its overwhelmingly  largest 
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Mexicans  accounted  for just  over  1 out  of every  5 immigrants,  but  they  made  up  I  out  of 
every  3 children  of  immigrants;  put  somewhat  differently,  Mexicans  are  over-represented 
among  the  second  generation,  relative  to  their  share  among  the  foreign-born,  by 50 
percent.  Absent  the Mexicans,  to&y’s  second  generation  looks  little  different  from  the 
rest  of  the American  population  in socio-economic  characteristics.  Those  characteristics 
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generation;  but  the  same  can be  said  for  young,  third-generation-plus  Americans  of any 
ethnic  stripe.  And  a very  large  proportion  of the  second  generation  begins  with  a 
substantial  edge  over  their  third-generation-plus  counterparts. 
By  contrast,  at the  turn  of the  century,  no  single  group  could  have  altered 
the  generalization  that  most  immigrants  were  much  more  likely  than  natives  to  start  out 
near  the  bottom;  Of course.  there  has  been  heteroeeneitv  amone  immigrant  flows  in everv  --  __-___, _--_-- ---_  _p-.‘___, _____..~  ____  .  p_-.._ -_-  -  -__  -  _~J 
period;  there  were  high-skilled  Germans  and  English  immigrants  coming  in large  numbers 
in the  1890- 1920  period,  for  example;  likewise,  the  literate,  English-speaking,  though  low- 
skilled  Irish  remained  importance  up  until  the  shut-off  of immigration  in the  1920s.  But 
the  skill level  of the  skilled  today  is very  much  higher  than  in the  past;  the  situation  in 
which  one  gr&p  is especially  large  and  especially  low-skilled  is unique  too.  One  could 
not,  we  suspect,  remove  the  Italians  from  the  discussions  of immigration  in  1920  and  find 
that  generalizations  about  differences  between  immigrants  and  natives,  or  about  the  skill 
level  of immigrants,  change  dramatically.  More  to  the  point:  that  generalization  applied  to 
21 Emphasizing  the  importance  of the  Mexican-origin  component  doesn’t  make  it all- 
important.  Clearly,  there  are  individuals  in every  group  (including  the  children  of native 
whites)  who  are “at risk”  in the  sense  of having  little  education  and  access  to  few 
resources  of a parental  or neighborhood  kind.  Nor  are  the  Mexicans  the  only  origin 
group  among  whom  many  are at risk.  But  a comparison  of Mexicans  with  Cubans,  a 
group  that  has  received  great  attention  in the  literature,  puts  the  matter  in sharp  relief  It 
is not  simply  that  Cuban  immigrants  are  a much  smaller  group  than  the  Mexicans;  relative 
to  their  share  of the  immigrant  population  (3.7  percent  in  1990),  Cubans  are under- 
represented  among  the  children  of the  foreign-born  (2 percent  in  1990).  Moreover,  the 
Cuban  population  is slow  growing,  characterized  by a high  median  age  and  low  fertility. 
While  it may  well  be the  case  that  Cubans  are  all moving  into  the  middle-class,  either 
through  a path  mediated  by the  enclave  economy  or through  assimilation,  classical  style, 
the  quantitative  import  is relatively  slight.  And  it will also  get  slighter,  given  fertility 
patterns  and  immigration  trends  (indeed,  the  Cuban  share  of the  total  foreign-born 
population  has  declined  since  1990).  By  contrast,  in the  six years  since  1990,  Mexicans 
have  grown  from  22  percent  to  27 percent  of the  foreign-born,  with  no  evidence  that  the 
most  recent  immigrants  are  more  skilled  or better  educated  than  their  predecessors.  The  _ 
key  point,  therefore,  is that  no  group  is at all similar  to  the  Mexicans  in being 
simultaneously  (1) the  lowest-skilled  of all the  major  immigrant  groups  and  (2)  the 
overwhelmingly  largest  part  of the  total  immigrant  population. 
22 Specifying  the  at-risk  component  of the  second  generation,  and  understanding  the 
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hypothesis  takes  the  presence  of at-risk  populations  for  granted,  contending  instead  that 
shifts  on  the  demand  side  are the  key  factors  changing  the  opportunities  for  the  offspring 
of the  foreign-born.  But  even  if the  demand  side  conditions  are  changing  just  as the 
theory  of  segmented  assimilation  would  predict,  the  impact  would  be a good  deal  less 
severe  if Mexican-origin  children  were  not  so heavily  over-represented  among  the  children 
ofthe  fnreivn-hnrn  ___ “o__  ___--.  That  fact has little to  d_~  with  t.he rnnkleratinns  nf  chanvinv  -I_______ ________ __  __‘___~‘__~ 
economic  structure  emphasized  in the  literature,  but  rather  with  the  age  structure  of the 
Mexican  immigrant  population,  its fertility,  and  the  timing  of its moves  to  the  United 
States  -- factors  which  no  one  has yet  unpacked.  Moreover,  second  generation  outcomes 
do  seem  to  vary  with  other  demographic  factors  -- whether  a child  was  born  abroad  or  in 
the  U.S.;  the  presence  of  other  foreign-born  children  in the  household;  and  the  nativity 
status  of parents.  We  suspect  that  these  factors  differ  among  immigrant  groups,  with  the 
result  that  the  assimilation  process  will be more  advanced  among  some  groups  than  among 
others  simply  because  the  timing  of migration  reduces  the  likelihood  of a child’s  foreign 
birth  and  the  characteristics  of household  structure  provide  less  exposure  to  foreign-born 
persons.  Thinking  about  the  Cuban/Mexican  comparison  is instructive  in this  respect:  a 
somewhat  hiiher  proportion  of the  children  of Cuban  parents  are U.S.-born  than  is true 
among  Mexicans  (and  U.S.  birth  is actually  more  common  among  Mexican  than  among 
the  groups  whose  arrival  was  concentrated  in the  1980s  and  1990s).  And  migration  from 
Cuba  has  been  more  likely  to  involve  displacement  of full household  units  (as has  been 
23 true  for  many,  though  not  all, refugee  groups),  whereas  the  Mexican  pattern  has been  one 
of  seriai  migration,  with  men  forming  househoids  in Mexico,  and  then  oniy  much  iater 
bringing  spouse  and  children  over  to  “the  other  side.” 
Educational  attainment  and  labor  market  outcomes:  The  possibility  that  we 
have  a new,  expanded  underclass  in the  making  lends  the  edge  to  research  on  today’s 
second  generation.  In  our  view,  applying  the  “underclass”  concept  to  issues  of  second 
generation  adaptation  is not  a happy  event,  as the  concept  has been  mainly  successful  in 
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discussion  of problems  of urban,  African-American  poor.  But  whatever  the  problems  of 
the  concept  when  used  on  its home  territory,  it has traveled  poorly,  as it is employed 
inconsistently.  More  importantly,  its invocation  serves  the  rhetorical  device  of implying 
identity  between  an evolving  underclass  of immigrant  origins  and  an African-American 
underclass,  made  plausible  mainly  because  the  latter’s  existence  is presumed  to  be a matter 
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there  is clearly  slippage  in the  explanation,  as the  former  is generally  ascribed  to  structural 
changes  in the  environment  (as  in Wilson’s  account),  whereas  the  advent  of a second 
generation  underclass  results  from  cultural  diffusion,  notwithstanding  a very  different 
environment. 
The  chapter  on  “Growing  up  American”  in Portes  and  Rumbaut’s  new  edition  of 
their  justly  influential  Immigrant  America  (1996)  exemplifies  both  the  tenor  and  the  cast 
taken  by today’s  discussion.  On the  one  hand,  today’s  immigrants  converge  on  poor, 
central  cities,  where  they  come  “into  close  contact  with  the  urban  underclass.”  To  be 
24 sure,  P&es  and  Rumhnllt  nnte  that  the  making  of  this  urban  un&rc!ass  regu!t.s  from_  ----  _-_---___.  ..___  _----  _--_ ____  ___._  ~  --  _---_ 
discrimination  and  changing  economic  structure  of the  cities;  but  to  these  causes  they 
ascribe  “the  development  of an adversarial  outlook  toward  middle-class  culture  (emphasis 
added);”  and  they  also  see  no  need  to  explain  what  the  underclass  is and  how  it differs 
from  a lower  or  poor  working-class  of before. 
In  any  case,  geographic  proximity  to  the  underclass  matters  because  it leaves 
second  generation  kids  hanging  around  with  the  wrong  crowd,  not  a good  thing  since 
immigrant  kids  pick  up  the  wrong  attitudes  of their  native-born  peers  (an  argument  which 
implicitly  revives  earlier  theories,  from  the  deviance  literature,  of differential  association). 
Native  born  underclass  youth  “exercise  a powerful  influence  on  newly  arrived  youth  by 
reinterpreting  for  them  the  difficult  conditions  of adaptation....creating  the  conditions  for  a 
problematic  mode  of dissonant  acculturation (248-9;  emphasis  added).”  Through  a 
“sociulization process”  (emphasis  added),  newcomers’  loyalties  “shift toward  the  common 
adversarial  stance  of their  native-born  peers.”  (249) 
Children  who  pick  up  the  adversarial  stance  are unlikely  to  do  well  in school.  Of 
course,  this  doesn’t  necessarily  translate  into  labor  market  disaster:  after  all, there  are  the 
low-level  jobs  occupied  by their  parents,  supposedly  so abundant.  But  the  parents  are 
caught  in a dead-end  mobility  trap;  and  educationally  unsuccessful  immigrant  children  “run 
the  risk  of being  trapped  into  the  same  low-paid  occupations  paid  by their  parents, 
confirming  the  dismal  portrayals  of apermanent  underclass.” (250;  emphasis  added). 
That  may  well  be; but  this  sort  of a permanent  underclass  is not  that  the  one  described  by 
Wilson  and  those  who  have  worked  on  the  terrain  he has laid  out.  As made  clear  by the 
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work  has  disappeared.  Whereas  African-American  ghetto  dwellers  seem  to  face  a penury 
ofjobs,  low-skilled  immigrants  enjoy  an abundant  opportunities  to  work,  albeit  at low 
wages.  From  this  perspective,  the  scenario  of segmented  assimilation  implies  a transition 
from  an underclass,  consisting  of people  employed  at the  very  bottom,  to  an outclass,  of 
persons  extruded  from  paid  employment. 
Here  the  contrast  between  the  two  accounts  of underclass  development  becomes  _~ _...__~  __..__  __ 
clear.  In the  Wilsonian  view,  the  underclass  is the  product  of the  disappearance  of the 
factory  sector,  the  outmigration  of the  black  middle  class,  and  the  resulting  social  isolation 
of the  poor.  Lacking  the  regulative  structure  of work,  as well  as the  institutions,  informal 
connections,  and  role  models  provided  by the  more  complete  ghetto  community  of old, 
ghetto  dwellers  alter  behavioral  patterns  and  attitudes;  they  respond  to  the  changes  around 
them  in self-defeating  and  self-reproducing  ways.  In comparison,  the  low-wage  sector 
(and  in southern  California,  at least,  this  largely  means  a factory  sector)  is still going 
strong  in immigrant  communities.  Indeed,  the  low-wage  sector  is so  strong  that  almost 
everyone  works  -- consider  the  fact  that  in Los  Angeles  employment  rates  for Mexican 
immigrant  men  begin  at the  80 percent  level  for  those  with no schooling  at all and  go  up 
from  there;  from  the  Wilsonian  approach,  employment  rates  of these  magnitudes  would 
make  work  n&mative.  The  density  of persons  with jobs  is itself  a source  of  social  capital, 
improving  the  quantity  and  quality  ofjob-related  information  and  embedding  job-seekers 
in informal  networks  that  transmit  skills  once  jobs  are  acquired.  Is it unreasonable  to 
26 Granted,  we  are  describing  a first  generation  phenomenon  and  one  can  certainly 
imagine  a scenario  characterized  by inter-generational  discontinuity,  as suggested  by the 
hypothesis  of  segmented  assimilation.  But  we  caution  against  going  down  that  road  too 
fast.  The  analogy  is clearly  overdrawn:  East  Los  Angeles  bears  little  resemblance  to  the 
south  side  of Chicago,  in either  its past  or present  incarnations.  If the  concept  of  social 
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since  the  children  of less-skilled  immigrants  are far more  likely,  than  comparable  African- 
Americans,  to  live  in neighborhoods  with  dense  job  networks,  and  to  also  grow  up  in 
households  where  the  head  is employed,  we  would  expect  higher  employment  rates  among 
second  generation  school-leavers  or  high  school  completers,  as compared  to  their  African- 
American  counterparts.  It is also  worth  recalling  that  the  embedding  of immigrant 
communities  is: at least  in part,  a response  to  employers’  favorable  views  of the  work  ethic 
and  behavior  of the  foreign-born;  for  that  reason,  one  can  expect  that  immigrant  children 
enter  a reception  context  quite  different  from  that  encountered  by their  African-American 
counterparts.  The  penetration  of immigrant  networks  is also  now  very  deep,  which  in the 
Los  Angeles  case  means  that  there  are  still plenty  of Mexican  sweepers  and  sewers,  but 
also  quite  a few  foremen  and  skilled  workers,  which  in turn  provides  the  second 
generation  with  access  to job  opportunities  well  above  the  bottom.  As  immigration  itself 
generates  ample  needs  for  bilingual  speakers  (whether  in hospitals,  department  stores,  or 
21 factories),  it creates  positions  for  which  the  children  of immigrants  are  ideally  suited 
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But  couldn’t  this  all be undone  by the  workings  of the  famous  “oppositional 
culture”?  Perhaps,  but  we  note  that  an “oppositional  culture”  has  historically  been  a 
characteristic  of working-class  communities;  in the  past,  it emerged  from  the  immigrant 
experience  without exposure  to  a “proximal  host”  comprised  of visible,  stigmatized, 
native-born  minorities  (see  Perlmann  and  Waldinger,  forthcoming).  The  “oppositional 
one  hand,  and  the  world  of manual  work  to  which  immigrant  children  were  destined,  on 
the  other.  That  disconnection  bred  revolt:  working-class  children  correctly  perceived  that 
school  had  little  to  do  with  their  chances  in life;  and they  also  reacted  against  the  middle- 
class  culture  of the  school  and  its denigration  of working-class  life and  labor.  Moreover, 
the  world  of the  factory  legitimates  values  quite  different  from  those  of the  classroom  -- 
nhvcicnlitv  tnllohnec<  !&gr  --  r--J” .----.,,  ‘..-D  -.-.-“,  the  themes  gun&-j  hv  Pm11  Willi<  I1 997)  in  his  _~  _ __.  . . ___-I  \-  - -  . ,  _*_  ---_ 
ethnography  of working-class  “lads”  in Britain,  but  which  reappear  in Douglas  Foley’s 
description  of lower-status,  Mexican  vatos in a south  Texas  high  school: 
Most  aspired  to  working  class jobs  like their  fathers’,  such  as driving  a tractor, 
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Some  wanted  to  be carpenters  and  bricklayers,  or work  for  the  highway  road  crew. 
Being  able to  survive  on  a blacktopping  crew  during  the  summer  heat  was 
considered  a very  prestigious  job...It  was  dangerous,  dirty,  heavy  work  that  only 
“real  men”  did.  It was  a true  test  of a young  man’s  body  and  character.,,the  vatos 
preferred...rough  physical  work..They  considered  working  with  their  hands 
honorable...In  contrast,  school  work  was  seen  as boring,  sissy  stuff  (1990:  87) 
As this  quote  suggests,  the  opposition  between  working-class  students  and  their  schools  is 
also  gendered  -- no  surprise,  as it is prefigured  in such  earlier  ethnographic  works  as 
28 Gans.  Relative  to  the  factory,  the  high  school  is a more  “feminine”  institution,  one  in 
which  women  play  a prominent  role;  as the  high  school  also  transmits  skills  that  are more 
likely  to  be immediately  valued  by the  employers  of women  than  by the  employers  of men, 
mnle  wnrkino-rlR<q  z&!escents  are  g-g-e  &e!v  tn  drift  intn  revnit,  than  their  fern&  ._.-._  ., ..,.  .  .  .  .  .  D  _._“_  ,  --  -----  ----- 
counterparts. 
We  concede  that,  in the  past,  school  could  be flaunted  with  relative  impunity,  as 
long  as there  was  a vibrant  factory-based  economy,  which  unsuccessful  students  could 
access  through  the  help  of relatives  and  neighborhood-based  friends.  The  stronger  the 
industrial  economy,  the  greater  the  value  placed  on  manual  work,  which  in turn  sanctioned 
youth  rebellion  and  gave  it a ritualized  form.  But  to  make  the  point  this  way  also  implies 
that  any  “oppositional  culture,”  if so  it should  be characterized,  was  a transitional 
phenomenon,  associated  with  the  passage  from  adolescence  to  adulthood,  and  fading  in 
salience  as attachment  to  work  progressed. 
And  it is one  thing  to  concede  that  today’s  factory  sector  is no  longer  so  strong  as 
in the  past;  another  to  note  that  neither  manufacturing  nor  other  forms  of manual  work 
have  disappeared,  especially  in such  areas  of immigrant  concentration  as Texas  or 
California.  Though  the  literature  is fragmentary,  it appears  that  both  the  traditional 
working-class  oppositional  culture  and  its related  pattern  of protracted  settling  down  into 
the  labor  market  persist,  albeit  in attenuated  form,  in the  remaining  ethnic  working-class 
enclaves  in the  Northeast  and  Midwest.  And  for  all the  reasons  noted  above,  an 
“oppositional  culture”  may  therefore  remain  an aspect  of the  second  generation,  working 
class  transition  to  adulthood,  and  not  involve  resocialization  into  the  underclass. 
29 Although  the  implicit  worry  surrounding  the  second  generation  literature  is that  the 
-1.*1  3  cnnaren  of immigrants  face  a future  of an African-American  type,  we  are  aiso  struck  by 
the  fact  that  the  comparison,  while  implicit  in all the  discussions,  has  not  squarely  been 
framed.  The  conventional  wisdom  strikes  the  underclass  note  in a second  way,  through 
historical  analogy,  implying  that  the  at-risk  children  of today’s  immigrants  may 
recapitulate  the  earlier  black  (or  Puerto  Rican  experience),  not  so much  for  the  reasons  of 
cultural  diffision  mentioned  above,  but  because  of  similarity  in the  historical  experiences. 
Th,  In++.-., n.-a..,."  nrr+  ,+.-..?.l,  A..?.  +I\ rl:n,w:m:..nc:~~  ,..,I  ,-I:-:,:,l.:..,  n....,..4....:+:A"  CA.-.L, 
111c  IcaLCCL  &"upJ  5"L  >L,LlbI\,  ULlC  L"  U13L1,I‘II‘IQLI"II  cl,,"  ULLLLl‘ll~lllll~  "t.'P"L  LU,,lllCJ  I"1  LllC 
low  skilled;  as Portes  puts  it (1996:5),  the  “perpetuation  of these  negative  conditions 
eventually  led  to  an interrelated  set  of urban  pathologies.”  This  characterization  faithfully 
echoes  the  basic  Wilsonian  view;  but  the  underlying  similarity  of experience  requires  a 
second  look.  Certainly,  contrasts  abound,  at least  if the  relevant  comparisons,  involve  the 
African-American  migrants  from  the  south,  circa  1940-1965,  with  the  low-skilled 
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occupied  a marginal  position  in the  urban  economy,  still heavily  dependent  on  the 
traditional  service  occupations,  en route  to  a concentration  in the  public  sector,  and 
enjoying  only  limited  success  in finding  manufacturing  jobs.  By  contrast,  Mexican 
immigrants,  exploited  proletarians  that  they  are,  have  nonetheless  moved  into  a wide 
swath  of the  region’s  economy,  from  which  they  are unlikely  to  be  dislodged.  In this 
respect,  the  most  oppressed  of America’s  new  immigrants  occupy  a position  of  structural 
centrality,  quite  unlike  the  marginal  role  filled  by urban  African-Americans  at a comparable 
point  in their  movement  to  urban  centers.  For  that  reason,  the  children  of today’s 
30 Mexican  immigration  will probably  have  a better  chance  of finding  positions  up  the job 
ladder  than  did  the  children  of the  great  black  migration  northwards. 
Conciusion:  Second  Generation  Prospects 
The  descendants  of the  last great  immigration  to  the  United  States  have  now  moved 
far up  the  totem  pole;  from  the  perspective  of the  1990s  it is hard  to  imagine  that  their 
adaptation  to  American  could  have  turned  out  differently.  But  this  view  of an inexorable 
climb  up  the  social  ladder  is certainly  not  how  the  children  and  grandchildren  of the  European 
immigrants  experienced  the  process  themselves.  Their  beginnings  were  not  particularly 
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their  descendants.  And  there  is every  reason  to  think  that  the  earlier  second  generation 
movement  upward  involved  a variety  of patterns  and  strategies,  sufftciently  complex  to  defy  a 
characterization  as dependent  on  good  manufacturing  jobs  alone. 
At  a minimum,  this  portrait  of the  past  suggests  that  the  children  of the  post-1965 
immigration  begin  with  disadvantages  no  greater  than  those  encountered  by immigrant 
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immigrants’  class  composition  is far more  heavily  weighted  toward  the  middle-class  than 
was  true  earlier  in the  century.  And  on  the  other  hand,  American  society  is more  receptive 
to  immigrant  incorporation  -- in large  measure,  due  to  the  efforts  by earlier  groups  of 
outsiders  widen  access  to  opportunity. 
Two  themes  emerge  from  this  comparison:  class  and  mobility  regimes. 
overwhelmingly  largest  component  -- the  Mexicans  -- falls at the  very  bottom  of the  skill 
31 ladder;  the  Mexicans  are  even  more  heavily  represented  among  the  immigrants’  children. 
Absent  the  Mexicans  todav’s  second  generation  looks  little  different  from  the  rest  ofthe  ,  ---~- 
American  population  in socio-economic  characteristics.  Those  characteristics  are not 
sufficient  to  guarantee  satisfactory  adjustment  to  the  economy  of the  next  generation;  but 
the  same  can  be  said  for  young,  third-generation-plus  Americans  of any  ethnic  stripe.  The 
immigrant  children  most  at risk  are the  Mexicans;  and  it is the  presence  of this  very  large 
group,  so far below  the  others  in skills,  that  distinguishes  today’s  from  yesterday’s  second 
generation.  However,  we  note  that  the  advent  of the  new  economy  means  trouble  for  the 
children  of the  native-born  members  of America’s  working-class,  who  also  find  themselves 
in conflict  with  the  middle-class  values  and  expectations  of  schools.  These  are the  main 
reasons  why  we  should  worry  about  the  future  for  the  offspring  of Mexican  immigrants 
and  of other  less  skilled  newcomers. 
Mobiliry  regimes:  In the  main,  the  offspring  of the  1880-1920  immigrant  wave 
advanced  through  movement  into  a prosperous  working-class.  But  that  prosperity  was,  at 
least,  in part  the  result  of concerted,  collective  efforts,  transforming  mobility  regimes  from 
the  highly  inegalitarian  pattern  that  characterized  the  immigrant  period,  to  the  more 
redistributionist  pattern  in place  durng  the  New  Deal  era.  The  children  of today’s 
immigrants  come  of age  in a different  mobility  regime,  in which  market  is taking 
precedence  over  state.  Good  news  for  the  children  of middle-class  immigrants,  as well  as 
for  those  many  immigrant  children  of working-class  parents  who  do  well  in school,  and 
take  advantage  of the  large,  and  relatively  open  U.S.  system  of higher  education.  After 
all, college  educated  persons  are the  winners  in today’s  economy,  which  rewards  the 
32 highly  skilled  in increasingly  generous  ways:  the  high  rates  of college  attendance  and 
completion  among  the  children  of Asian,  Middle  Eastern,  and  other  immigrant 
backgrounds  leave  these  groups  positioned  for  improving  fortunes  in the  new  economy. 
Bad  news,  however,  for  those  children  of working-class  -- or  poor  -- immigrant 
parents.  The  metaphor  of the  “hourglass  economy”  -- many  good  jobs  at top,  many  bad 
jobs  at bottom,  few  decent  jobs  in-between  -- provides  one  way  for  describing  their 
problems,  but  it takes  the  structure  for  granted.  While  the  supply/demand  equation  for 
less  skilled  workers  of all ethnic  backgrounds  has turned  unfavorable  for  a host  of reasons, 
the  decline  of working-class  power,  and  of the  collective  institutions  established  during  the 
New  Deal  era,  ranks  high  on  the  list.  As in the  past,  “second  generation  revolt”  could  well 
be the  engine  for  turning  things  around;  and  second  generation  rebellion  need  not  only 
take  the  individualistic  form  assumed  by the  literature  on  segmented  assimilation.  Yet  it is 
one  thing  to  imagine  a turn  toward  collective  efforts  at group  advancement  among  the 
children  of Mexican  and  other  working-class  immigrants,  still another  to  think  that  those 
collective  efforts  would  yield  results  comparable  to  the  gains  produced  by the  New  Deal 
era.  Perhaps,  but  only  if current  trends  toward  an increasingly  global,  increasingly 
competitive  economy  reverse.  Those  prospects,  regrettably,  do  not  seem  bright. 
33 ’  See Gans,  1992; Portes and Zhou (1993); Portes and Rumbaut,  1996; Zhou and Bankston,  forthcoming. 
’  See the articles  in the republished  version  of the special IMR  issues that appears  as The New Second 
Generaiion  @?OiieS, i996j. 
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